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Abstract. This article decomposes the observed gaps in educational attainment and school-to-work 
transitions in Belgium between grandchildren of natives and of women of “non-Western” 
nationality into (i) differences in observed family endowments and (ii) a residual “pure ethnic gap”. 
It innovates by explicitly taking delays in educational attainment into account, by identifying the 
moments at which the pure ethnic gaps arise, by disentangling the decision to continue schooling at 
the end of a school year from the achievement within a particular grade, and by integrating the 
language spoken at home among observed family endowments. The pure ethnic gap in educational 
attainment is found to be small if delays are neglected, but substantial if not and for school-to-work 
transitions. It is shown that more than 20% of the pure ethnic gap in graduating from secondary 
school without delay originates in tenth grade. Language usage explains only part of the gap in 
school-to-work transitions for low educated.  
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1. Introduction 
In Europe school-to-work transitions are much more successful for native youth than for ethnic 
minority youth. In 2011, the youth unemployment rate of non-EU-15 residents in the EU-15 was as 
high as 29% compared to 20% for natives.
1
 In Belgium, the country of analysis, these figures 
attained 32% and 18%, resulting in a gap of fourteen percentage points, which is reported to be one 
of the largest in the OECD (OECD, 2008; Nonneman, 2012). This gap is particularly worrisome, 
since the higher incidence of unemployment at the start of the career can induce long-lasting scars 
on the subsequent career development (see, e.g., Arulampalam, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005; 
Mroz and Savage, 2006). Therefore, not surprisingly, the OECD (2010) calls ethnic minority youth 
a target group for intensive assistance. The question is whether this is the right response. It is if the 
observed unemployment gaps are induced by pure ethnic differences in behavior or by 
discrimination. However, if these gaps just mirror different family endowments that result in 
different levels of educational attainment and therefore in different labor market performances, then 
no specific measures for minority youth are required to eliminate this gap. Heckman (2011), for 
instance, argues that in contemporary American society the racial gap in achievement is primarily 
due to gaps in skills and that, consequently, by closing the gaps in skills, the racial gap disappears. 
According to this view discrimination in the educational system and in the labor market are not an 
issue and policies need not be targeted to ethnic minorities but rather to providing support to 
disadvantaged families of all racial and ethnic backgrounds as early as possible as to enhance the 
skills of their children.  
School attainment and early labor market outcomes of immigrant youth have been studied amply 
in the literature. Researchers have mostly focused on a single or a couple of educational or labor 
market transitions in isolation from related transitions, such as the decision to enroll in tertiary 
education (see, e.g., Hagy and Staniec, 2002), the probability of succeeding the first year at 
university (see, e.g., Ortiz and Dehon, 2008) or the probability of a successful transition to work 
(see, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin, 1998; Ryan, 2001; Pozzoli, 2009). A problem with this literature is 
that analyses that ignore the dynamic sorting that takes place in the educational progression are 
biased. Cameron and Heckman (1998) show this formally. Intuitively, this bias is brought about by 
the progressively growing negative correlation between observed endowments, such as the parental 
educational attainment, and unobserved endowments because pupils with adverse observed 
endowments pass the final evaluation at the end of a particular grade and continue schooling only if 
                                                 
1 Source: Eurostat (Labor Force Study: Unemployment rates by sex, age groups and nationality). Youth is defined as individuals between 15 and 24 years 
old. 
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their unobserved endowments are sufficiently favorable. This biases the coefficients of the observed 
endowments downwards and more so as one proceeds to higher grades. 
Cameron and Heckman (2001) explicitly address this selectivity problem by modeling, beyond 
the maximum compulsory school age, the decision to drop out in each school year as a dynamic 
discrete choice model that explicitly takes into account unobserved determinants of this decision that 
can generate the aforementioned sorting. Based on this model they investigate the sources of racial 
and ethnic disparity in college attendance. They find that the racial gap in educational attainment is 
eliminated or even reversed once they adjust for differences in parental background and family 
environment.  
These conclusions are not only relevant for the US. For instance, based on a version of the model 
of Cameron and Heckman (2001) that disregards the age dimension, Belzil and Poinas (2010) report 
that the gap in higher educational attainment between second generation immigrants and natives in 
France is mainly explained by family background. In addition, these authors study the gap in the 
school to work transition and find that the gap in access to permanent employment is nearly 
completely closed once both family background and educational attainment is conditioned upon. 
Colding (2006) and Colding et al. (2009) also disregard the age dimension but extend the model of 
Cameron and Heckman (2001) by taking into account that students need not only to decide whether 
they continue education beyond the current grade level, but also, if they proceed, in which branch 
(e.g. academic or vocational). They estimate this model on Danish data. Their results corroborate 
previous findings that family background is an important determinant of educational outcomes, but 
also demonstrate that differences in endowments alone do not explain the observed gap in 
educational attainment between natives and ethnic minorities in Denmark. 
In this paper we follow this line of research to study to what extent the ethnic gap in educational 
attainment and in school-to-work transitions in Belgium can be explained by observed family 
endowments or whether a residual pure ethnic gap, reflecting differences in behavior and 
unobserved endowments, or discrimination, remains present. Our analysis is based on a 
retrospective survey taken at age 23 of a representative sample of three cohorts born in 1976, 1978 
and 1980, living in Flanders, the Northern Dutch speaking region of Belgium. It contrasts natives to 
grandchildren of women of “non-Western” nationality, born in Belgium or immigrated prior to age 
three. The latter selection avoids that the pure ethnic gap partly captures the effects of additional 
barriers that recent immigrants face (see, e.g., Colding et al., 2009). 
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, in the past researchers have studied 
ethnic gaps in the attainment of particular levels of education, such as secondary school completion 
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or college entry, irrespectively of the age at which these levels are attained. However, since, 
depending on the educational system, youths can be retained at various points in the educational 
career, youths may attain these levels at different ages. This matters. Even if retention may improve 
educational achievement,
2
 it is costly if it eventually induces pupils to enter the labor market with 
delay and if employers use it as a negative signal of productivity in their hiring decision. In this 
study we therefore explicitly take these delays into account both when measuring educational 
attainment, and by explicitly modeling them as outcomes and determinants of schooling 
progression. We show that conclusions crucially depend on whether or not delays are considered in 
the measure of educational achievement.
3
 
Second, we propose a method to decompose the residual pure ethnic gap according to the 
moment at which this gap is generated. We do this by studying to what extent this gap diminishes 
by sequentially conditioning on prior levels of educational attainment. As such, critical grades of 
study can be identified in which the pure ethnic gap arises more prominently than in other grades. 
This can be a useful tool to get a better understanding where this gap originates from. In this study 
the data allow us to identify whether the gap originates in primary school or in any grade beyond 
age twelve. This is much earlier than in the literature so far that usually starts analyzing these gaps 
from around grade nine in secondary school.
 
 
Third, we move a step forward by disentangling the educational outcomes within a particular 
grade. Sociologists Boudon (1974) and Erikson et al. (2010) argue that observed social class 
schooling differentials result both from the “primary effects” of differing levels of academic 
performance, i.e. passing or failing, and from the “secondary effects” in the educational choices, i.e. 
continuing school or dropping out, that one makes at given levels of performance. The pure ethnic 
gaps may emerge within these steps of the educational progression with a different magnitude or 
even in the opposite direction, which may call for different policy actions. We distinguish in our 
empirical analysis between the educational achievement (passing or failing) realized at the end of 
each grade and the decision to continue schooling (rather than stopping) at the end of each school 
year and we allow the outcomes of each of these components to depend on past decisions and 
achievements.  
A final innovation is that we integrate the language spoken at home among the observed family 
                                                 
2 Most studies actually find that retention has a negative impact on educational achievement (see Xia and Kirby, 2009, for a survey). Only Jacob and 
Lefgren (2004) and D’Haultfoeuille (2010) find short-term positive effects on educational performance. 
3 Cameron and Heckman (2001) also implicitly model schooling delay since they allow schooling choices at particular grades to depend on age. However, 
they only take these delays into account for one particular outcome: the probability of being in grade nine or higher at age 15. For all other outcomes they 
consider the schooling outcomes at age 24, an age at which most schooling must be completed, irrespectively of schooling delays.  
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endowments. Language is reported to be an important determinant of school and labor market 
success. van Ours and Veenman (2003) conclude that language proficiency of migrants in the 
Netherlands has a positive effect on the educational attainment of their sons but no effect on the 
educational attainment of their daughters. Dustmann et al. (2010) indicate language as the key factor 
for minority youth in the UK to catch up with white pupils throughout compulsory schooling. 
Moreover, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003), Chiswick (2008) and Aldashev et al. (2009) conclude that 
migrants who speak the language of their destination country have better labor market prospects. 
Therefore, it may matter to control for language usage in an analysis of the determinants of ethnic 
gaps in schooling and labor market outcomes. 
This article is structured in the following way. Section 2 summarizes the institutional setting: the 
educational system and the youth labor market in Belgium. The next section describes the dataset 
and provides descriptive statistics that motivate our analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric 
model and the simulation and decomposition methodology. The empirical findings are reported 
subsequently, starting with an assessment of the model in terms of within-sample fit and followed 
by a series of counterfactual simulations that aim at answering the main research questions. A final 
section concludes. 
2. The Institutional Setting: Education and Youth Labor Market4  
In Belgium the language communities (Flemish and French) are in charge of the organization of 
the educational system, while labor market regulation is in the period of analysis mostly organized 
at the national level. Since the data we analyze concern only inhabitants of Flanders, we restrict the 
description to the Flemish educational system. School choice is free at all levels and schools are 
mixed in that children cannot be refused on grounds of gender or ethnicity. Education is compulsory 
from the first of September of the year in which a child reaches age six and lasts until his/her 
eighteenth anniversary or the 30
th
 of June of the year in which (s)he reaches age eighteen. Even 
though a regular student graduates from (the sixth
5
 grade of) secondary school at age eighteen, this 
is not the case for an important share (40%), since students who do not attain a certain competency 
level are retained and thus required to repeat the school year. This retention may already take place 
in primary school. Talented pupils can skip grades in nursery and primary school. In our dataset 107 
                                                 
4 For more details on the educational system, see De Ro (2008). 
5 This corresponds to twelfth grade in the US. In the sequel of this paper we reset, in accordance with the Flemish system, the counter of grades to zero at 
the start of secondary school.  
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(89) of the 7,256 native children start primary (secondary) school at age five (eleven) instead of six 
(twelve). None of the immigrant children skip a grade. Special (nursery, primary or secondary) 
education is aimed at children who need special help, temporarily or permanently. This may be due 
to physical or mental disability, serious behavioral or emotional problems, or serious learning 
difficulties. In our research project, these pupils (1% of the total number) are dropped from the 
sample. 
Children can enter nursery school when they are two and a half to three years old. Although 
nursery education is not compulsory, in Flanders 98% of the kids attend it. A child usually starts 
primary education at age six, but if the child is not school ready entry can be delayed. Primary 
education comprises six consecutive years of study. When graduating from primary school, students 
enter secondary education. Without grade retention (or grade skipping) at primary school pupils 
enter secondary education in the year in which they reach age twelve. At this point pupils choose 
between four tracks: general, technical, arts or vocational. A pupil is granted the diploma of general, 
technical or arts secondary education after successfully completing six years (“grades”). Without 
grade retention (or grade skipping), this occurs in the last compulsory schooling year, at age 
eighteen. Students in the vocational track are granted a secondary school diploma only after 
completing a seventh grade, but, since this seventh grade involves quite some specialization, we 
assimilate it in this study as part of higher (tertiary) education. Students with a secondary school 
diploma can enroll directly, without any entry exam,
6
 into higher (tertiary) education, i.e. college or 
university. Our observation period of education registrations is prior to adoption of the Bologna 
process. Three sorts of higher education degrees could be obtained: (i) non-university of the “short 
type” (typically vocationally oriented and lasting three years), (ii) non-university of the “long type” 
(typically four years mixing a vocational and a more academic curriculum) and (iii) academic 
university education (typically four or five years). No tuition fee has to be paid at nursery, primary 
and secondary school and very low and stable tuition fees (from €80 to €600 in 2012, depending on 
the parents’ income) in higher education. Twenty-two colleges and seven universities are spread 
over less than 14,000 km² resulting in a high regional diffusion of providers of tertiary education.  
There is no compulsory military service in Flanders and school-leavers enter the labor market 
directly after school leaving. Moreover – and different from other countries and regions – school-
leavers can claim unemployment benefits after a “waiting period” of nine months. This period starts 
with the registration at the employment office after leaving school. Labor regulation distinguishes 
between two types of labor contracts: with time stipulation (temporary employment contracts) and 
                                                 
6 The only exception is the entry exam for students who want to study medicines. 
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without time stipulation (permanent employment contracts). A finite number of successive 
temporary employment contracts, between the same employee and employer, are permitted for a 
maximum of three years. 
3. Data and Some Facts 
3.1 The Data: Retrospective Survey of a Representative Sample of Three Birth Cohorts 
The data source (the so called “SONAR” data) consists of representative samples of 3,000 
individuals each of three cohorts born in 1976, 1978 and 1980 and living in Flanders when they 
were 23 years old, the moment of interview. Follow-up interviews were conducted at age 26 and/or 
29. Data of these follow-up interviews were, however, not used in the main analysis to avoid drop-
out selectivity. They are only used in a sensitivity analysis discussed below. This database contains 
exceptionally rich information on both the educational career and the start of the labor market 
career. It contains, apart from a range of socio-economic variables, monthly information on the 
educational choices and progression as well as on the labor market status
7
 from the moment 
secondary school is entered,
8
 until the moment of the last interview. In addition, the age at which 
primary school is started is reported. This information was collected by trained interviewers 
conducting oral interviews at the interviewees’ home address. 
3.2 Motivating Gaps 
Throughout this article, two sub-populations of the SONAR cohorts are indexed by the 
nationality of their grandmother on mother’s side. On the one hand, we identify “natives”, i.e. 
youths whose grandmother on mother’s side possesses the Belgian nationality (8,091 individuals). 
On the other hand, we consider “immigrants”, i.e. youth whose grandmother on mother’s side 
neither has the Belgian nationality nor any other Western
9
 nationality (545 individuals). This group 
is heterogeneous since the nationality of the grandmother does not determine the moment at which 
the immigration occurred. Card (2005) and Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) find that the 
educational attainments of the immigrants of the second generation are better than the ones of the 
first generation. We therefore make the group more homogeneous by only retaining grandchildren 
                                                 
7 An individual is employed when holding a job of at least one hour a week and during at least one month. Part-time jobs held by students in the vocational 
track are not considered as employment, but as part of the educational career. 
8 As indicated before, in principle, secondary school is started in the year of one’s twelfth anniversary. In case of grade skipping or retention, this can be at 
an earlier or later age. 
9 In particular, by “Western” nationality we refer to a North American, British, Scandinavian, Western European or Australian nationality. 
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who resided and went to school in Flanders from the start of nursery school onwards. This means 
that we essentially exclude first generation immigrants from the sample.
10
 In a robustness check we 
further enhance the homogeneity of the sample by restricting our sample to respondents with the 
Belgian nationality (at age 23). Consequently, if the findings of the aforementioned authors apply 
for Belgium, the gaps in the educational attainment found in this research are a lower bound for the 
gap of first generation immigrants. 
Dropping individuals with (i) missing explanatory variables; (ii) inconsistent school registrations 
and (iii) years of special education (cf. Section 2) we obtain a sample of 7,256 native respondents 
and 359 immigrant respondents. Among the immigrants those with a Turkish (122 individuals) and 
Moroccan (87 individuals) origin are highly represented. 316 of these 359 immigrant respondents 
have the Belgian nationality at age 23. In the benchmark analysis all 359 immigrants are considered 
as one group. However, in sensitivity analyses, we restrict once the immigrant sample to those of 
Turkish and Moroccan origin and once to those of Belgian nationality at age 23. In what follows, we 
refer to “natives” and “immigrants”11 according to the definitions in this section. 
Figure 1 presents some relevant observed gaps in school attainment and successful transitions to 
work between the native and immigrant groups in our dataset. First, we present the gaps for two key 
schooling outcomes: (i) passing sixth grade of (and thereby graduating from) secondary education 
and (ii) enrolling in tertiary education. Concerning these outcomes, we distinguish between realizing 
them (without specifying any potential delay) and realizing them without schooling delay. Those in 
which schooling delay is left unspecified are usually considered in the literature. However, as 
argued in the Introduction, it makes sense to also consider educational outcomes specifying the 
delay with which they are attained, since eventual schooling delays are costly. They translate in 
postponed labor market entry and therefore in substantial foregone earnings. Moreover, these 
schooling delays are commonly experienced in the Flemish educational system: 40% of the pupils 
graduate from secondary school with delay.  
Second, we report, conditional on observed school attainment, the gap for being employed three 
months after leaving school as an indicator of successful school-to-work transition. We report this 
gap for low educated (defined as holding a secondary educational degree or lower) and high 
educated (defined as leaving school with one to four successful years of tertiary education and at 
                                                 
10 First-generation immigrants are only included to the extent that they immigrated to Belgium between birth and the start of nursery school at age three. 
We chose to not exclude them completely as to avoid a too small immigrant sample, but, as mentioned in the main text, performed a sensitivity analysis that 
makes this group more homogeneous by only retaining immigrants with the Belgian nationality. 
11 The label “immigrant” is therefore used somewhat loosely, since it essentially comprises immigrants beyond the first generation besides a minority of 
first-generation immigrants (see previous footnote). 
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most one year of schooling delay).
12
 We chose to condition this indicator on school attainment, 
since the observed gap in school-to-work transitions unconditional on school attainment is biased 
downwards, because some youth is still in education at the time that the survey is conducted at age 
23: this is more likely to be the case for natives and, since this group is more likely highly educated, 
its employment propensity is higher.  
The first two statistics in Figure 1 show that the observed ethnic gaps in school attainment are 
substantial, both in absolute and in relative terms. Native youth is 17 percentage points more likely 
than immigrant youth to graduate from secondary education, while they are 25 percentage points 
more likely to enroll into higher education. Proportionally, these gaps amount to 23% and 44%. 
These differences are even more outspoken if we consider the fractions of natives and immigrants 
who attain these educational levels without any schooling delay: 29 and 32 percentage points in 
absolute terms, or 83% and 119% in relative terms. Finally, the last two statistics illustrate that the 
observed gaps in the school-to-work transitions are also important, even if we condition on attained 
educational level. Observe that these gaps do not differ much between the low and the high 
educated: in absolute terms the difference is 20 to 23 percentage points while in relative terms this 
varies between 44% and 42%. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  
3.3 Explanatory Variables  
In this subsection, we describe the explanatory variables used for each modeled outcome. The 
choice of covariates is restricted by their availability, their required strict exogeneity, and by their 
relevance according to the existing research. Cameron and Heckman (2001) find that long-run 
factors associated with parental background and family environment are strong predictors of the 
educational disparity between natives and ethnic minorities in that once they control for these long-
term factors the gap in educational attainment is completely eliminated or even reversed. This is 
confirmed in the research of Belzil and Poinas (2010) and partly in that of Colding (2006) and 
Colding et al. (2009). We aim at verifying to what extent similar conclusions can be drawn for 
Belgium. 
We therefore include the following family endowments as explanatory variables: the gender, the 
educational attainment of father and that of mother, the number of siblings, the day of birth within a 
                                                 
12 The latter definition ensures that these high educated individuals have stopped studying at the moment of the interview (cf. the subsequent discussion in 
the main text), so that we can unambiguously define their employment status.  
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year, and an indicator whether or not Dutch (possibly among other languages) was spoken at home. 
The first four variables are standard ones that are also included by the other researchers.
13
 The day 
of birth is included as to control for age effects within a birth cohort for a given educational delay, 
since relative age within a birth cohort is found to positively affect educational achievements 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). Finally, we control for the language spoken 
at home, since this is arguably a key determinant of educational progression and labor market 
success for minority youth.
14
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of these variables by ethnicity. These statistics confirm that 
immigrant youths generally are characterized by more unfavorable family endowments than natives. 
First and most importantly, both fathers and mothers of immigrants have successfully completed on 
average more than three and a half years of education less than natives. Second, in the sample 
immigrants are slightly (nine days on average) younger than natives. Third, in only 79% of the 
immigrant households Dutch (possibly among other languages) is spoken, whereas this fraction 
attains 98% among the natives.
15
 The table indicates furthermore that immigrants have on average 
twice as many siblings as natives do and that the immigrant sample contains slightly more girls than 
that of the natives. The impact of the latter two variables on educational achievement and labor 
market outcomes is, however, not clearly established (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Ryan, 2001; 
Pozzoli, 2009; van der Klaauw and van Vuuren, 2010). 
In the literature one sometimes also controls in addition for family income, neighborhood 
characteristics, indicators of regional labor market conditions, the regional level of tuition fees and 
grants for college enrolment. Most of these controls are not included in our analysis. First, since the 
analysis is restricted to one region with a homogenous and stable schooling system, there is no need 
to control for regional variation in the features of the educational system. Second, we cannot take 
family income into account, since we do not have any information on it. However, this might not be 
problematic, since Cameron and Heckman (2001) find that family income plays only a minor role in 
explaining ethnic gaps in educational attainment in the US. However, we do include the annual 
regional unemployment rate in Flanders as a time-varying indicator of labor market conditions. The 
unemployment rate of the 24 to 64 year old male population proxies the labor market conditions of 
                                                 
13 Belzil and Poinas (2010) include information on the occupation of father and mother instead of their level of education and they do not condition on the 
number of siblings. 
14 See the references to the literature in the Introduction. 
15 Recall that the native and immigrant populations are determined on the basis of the Belgian or “non-Western” nationality of the grandmother on mother’s 
side. The fact that in a relatively high fraction of immigrant families Dutch is spoken at home can be explained by this definition and by the exclusion from 
the sample of immigrants who immigrated after age three. Since Belgium consists of an important French speaking community some of the natives may 
only speak French at home.  
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the (usually) male breadwinner during the period that his child is in education. It is therefore 
included as an explanatory variable in the logit models explaining the educational outcomes. By 
contrast, for the logit model that explains the transition from school to work, we include the youth 
(aged 15 to 24) unemployment rate as time-varying covariate. The evolution of these 
unemployment rates are described in Fout! Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden.1 and Table A–2 
reported in Appendix A. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Econometric Model 
Schooling outcomes (choices and results) at any age are the outcome of previous schooling 
outcomes (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Cameron and Heckman, 1998). The probability that a 
young person enrolls into college or university depends on secondary school graduation which in 
turn depends on successively passing each secondary school grade and afterwards deciding to 
continue schooling. To capture this sequential aspect of economic decisions and attainments, we 
extend the dynamic logit model of Cameron and Heckman (2001) by explicitly distinguishing 
between achievements (success or failure) within each school year and the subsequent decision to 
continue or stop schooling. Adding these achievements to the set of educational outcomes makes it 
possible to study ethnic gaps in school attainment before the end of compulsory education, point 
before which the decision to continue schooling is irrelevant. We do this by starting modeling 
schooling outcomes as from the start of primary school instead of from the end of compulsory 
education as researchers in past.  
We propose to evaluate the relative educational performance of immigrants relative to natives 
based on a cumulative measure of this educational achievement: the relative fraction that passes a 
particular educational grade without delay, i.e. without having failed in any past schooling year or 
without having started primary school with delay (unless this delay is undone by skipping a grade 
during primary education). By considering this new measure of educational achievement we 
introduce a finer measure than in the existing literature that considers school attainment 
irrespectively of delay. Moreover, since ethnic gaps according to this measure may arise at much 
earlier ages and are dynamically linked over time, a dynamic decomposition of this measure that 
allows identifying when the gap arises is a valuable tool. We propose a method to realize this 
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decomposition in Section 4.2. We first present the econometric model. 
We model the school progression as a sequence of discrete outcomes and choices. This sequence 
starts at the beginning of primary school. For most pupils this occurs at age six. However, as 
mentioned in Section 2 pupils can start primary school one year earlier
16
 or one year later. The 
starting point of our model is therefore an initial condition that models the number of years of delay 
(negative in case of an early start) at the start of primary schooling. Subsequently, since we only 
observe the grade by grade educational progression as from the start of secondary school, we group 
the progression made during primary school in a single stage in which we model the number of 
years of delay at the start of secondary education conditionally on the number of years of delay at 
the start of primary school. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of our modeling strategy from 
the first grade of secondary school onwards.
17
 We model for each (secondary and tertiary) schooling 
year, conditional on starting it, the probability of passing (P) respectively not passing (NP) and, 
conditional on this event, the probability to continue schooling (at a higher grade when passing or at 
the same grade when not passing). Finally, when leaving school, we model the probability of being 
employed three months later (W/NW).
18
  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
A couple of points should be noticed. First, as a consequence of mandatory schooling until age 
eighteen the probability of continuing school is below one only from the fourth grade of secondary 
school onwards. This is the point from which the dynamic sorting as induced by drop-out starts 
playing a role (cf. the Introduction). Second, each of the grade specific outcomes and choices are 
allowed to depend on the past history through the accumulated number of years of schooling delay 
and in the employment outcome in addition through the attained number of years of schooling. This 
introduces a second source of dynamic sorting, since students with successful schooling 
achievements possess more favorable unobserved endowments than those who have encountered 
schooling failures in the past. As to avoid selection bias induced by these sorting processes, we 
explicitly allow the choices and outcomes to depend on unobservable characteristics of individuals. 
Econometrically, our model is specified as a sequence of (ordered and binary) logistic 
probabilities. Rational and forward looking agents with a schooling status determined at each time 
period t by their obtained schooling level, i.e. grade g, and their accumulated years of school delay 
                                                 
16 This is not observed for immigrants in the data. 
17 If one has no delay, the first grade starts in September of the year that one becomes 12 years old. We continue counting when one completes mainstream 
secondary school after the sixth grade (without delay, this is at the school leaving age of 18) and pursues tertiary education.  
18 In a sensitivity analysis (cf. infra) we adopt employment with a permanent contract two years after leaving school as the labor market outcome. 
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tV , make their “choices” from a feasible choice set.
19
 We define 1t   and 1g   at the start of 
primary school and 0t   and 0g   at the start of secondary school. Subsequently, t increases by 
one unit for each year that passes since the start of secondary school and g increases by one unit for 
each successful schooling year that passes. A consequence is that, for 0t  , gtVV 0t  . The 
dependence on the grade g respectively on the schooling delay tV  
can be thought of as the memory 
of our model, increasing in each grade respectively at each year of grade retention. 
We distinguish between seven types of outcomes Og, depending on the considered (if still in 
education) or realized (if left education) grade g: (i) the years of delay at the start of primary 
education (O-1 = 1), (ii) the years of delay at the start of secondary education (O0 = 2), (iii) the 
school attainment (passing or not passing) at the end of each of the six grades of secondary 
education (Og = 3 for g = 1, 2,…, 6), (iv) the subsequent school decisions (continuing or stopping) 
at the end of grades four to six of secondary education (Og = 4 for g = 4, 5, 6), (v) the school 
attainments at the end of each grade of tertiary education (Og = 5 for g = 7, 8,…, 12), (vi) the 
subsequent school decisions at the end of each of the grades of tertiary education (Og = 6 for g = 7, 
8,…, 12) and (vii) the employment status three months after leaving school (Og = 7 for g = 3, 4,…, 
12). For each type of outcome Og that we consider here, the outcomes are ordered or binary. The 
choice set, denoted by g
O
C , can therefore be given by a set of ordinal numbers:  gg OO n,...,1,0C  , 
where g
O
n  defines the number of ordered choices minus one that can be made for outcome Og. In 
fact 1n g
O
  except for O-1 = 1 and for O0 = 2: 2n
1   ( 1n
1  ) for natives (immigrants), since the 
number of years of delay at the start of primary school varies between -1 and 1 (0 and 1) and 3n2   
( 2n2  ) for natives (immigrants), since the number of years of delay at the start of secondary 
school varies between -1 and 2 (0 and 2). 
The optimal choice 
gO
t,gcˆ  of an individual with respect to outcome type Og at time t in grade g (or 
after completing grade g in case that school is left) is then:  
 ggggg O
1c
O
c,t,g
O
c
OO
t,g UifCccˆ   , (1) 
where g
O
c,t,gU  is the latent utility of choice c for outcome type Og in (after) grade g at time t, and 
gO
c  
                                                 
19 We use quotation marks around the word “choices” as, properly speaking, (not) passing a grade and being employed three months after leaving school 
are not outcomes under full control of the modelled youth. 
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and 
gO
1c  are threshold utilities that determine the ordered choice ( 
gO
0  and 

g
gO
O
1n
 ).20 
As advocated by, e.g., Heckman (1981) and adopted by other authors, we approximate this g
O
c,t,gU  by 
a linear index:  
 gggg O
c,t,gt
OO
g
O
c,t,g VU  
gO
t βZ' , (2) 
where g
O
g  is a parameter that depends on the grade in which the outcome type Og is 
considered,
21,22
 tZ'  is a M1  vector representing the M number of (possibly time-varying) 
observed strictly exogenous variables, g
O
β
 
is the vector of associated parameters, g
O
  is a 
parameter measuring the effect of accumulated years of school delay and g
O
c,t,g  is unobservable 
from the point of view of the researcher. 
We follow Cameron and Heckman (2001) by assuming that g
O
c,t,g  is characterized by a factor 
structure. However, in line with the more recent literature (Carneiro et al., 2003; Heckman and 
Navarro, 2007; Fruehwirth et al. 2011), we generalize by allowing that the factor “loadings” depend 
on the treatment status, which in our case is the number of years of schooling delay tV : 
 gggg O
c,t,gt
OOO
c,t,g V   , (3) 
in which g
O
  and g
O

 
are outcome type specific coefficients and g
O
c,t,g  is the i.i.d. error term, and 
  is a random individual specific effect that is independent across people and that captures 
unobserved “abilities” affecting all outcomes considered in the model. Assuming that the 
unobserved determinants are common to all outcomes is restrictive, but, as shown in the 
aforementioned literature, the advantage of doing so is that it allows that the effect of schooling 
delay depends on unobserved heterogeneity,
23
 as it does by the introduction of the second term in 
Equation (3), and that this treatment heterogeneity can be identified non-parametrically. Fruehwirth 
et al. (2011) argue that this may be important and indeed find evidence of heterogeneous reactions 
                                                 
20 In the case of a binary choice the threshold g
O
1
 
is thus set to (minus) the constant term instead of to zero, since the constant term of the latent utility is 
normalized to zero. This leads to the standard logit model. 
21 The parameter corresponding to the first grade that can be observed within the outcome type is taken as the reference grade. It is normalized to zero, since 
it cannot be separately identified from the threshold utilities g
O
c . 
22 For the school outcomes in tertiary education (Og = 5 and Og = 6) and for the employment decision (Og = 7) we restrict the dependence to be linear in g.  
23 This is labeled “essential heterogeneity” by Heckman et al. (2006). 
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to grade retention. 
Identification of treatment heterogeneity in the effect of schooling delay does not require an 
exclusion restriction if the outcome in the first period, i.e. the number of years of delay at the start of 
primary school, is free of selection. This means that tZ'  should be independent of   for all g, t and 
choice sets g
O
C . Note that this does not mean that conditional on past choices beyond the start of 
primary school tZ'  is independent of  , since, as mentioned in the Introduction, dynamic sorting 
will induce negative correlation between favorable observed determinants of the educational 
outcomes that we consider, and the unobserved  . This is because pupils with unfavorable 
observed endowments experience successful educational outcomes only if these unfavorable 
endowments are compensated for by favorable unobserved endowments (Cameron and Heckman, 
1998). The independence assumption rather means that the unobserved abilities capture factors that 
are independent of observed family endowments. We improve in this respect on the existing 
literature by starting modeling the schooling progression from a much earlier point: at the start of 
primary school rather than at the end of mandatory schooling, usually around age 16. Consequently, 
in our approach the effect of observed family endowments on the educational outcomes is purged 
from the bias induced by the negative correlation with the unobserved determinants of successful 
schooling outcomes (i.e. no delay) during the period of mandatory schooling.
24
  
We assume that g
O
c,t,g  is logistically distributed, independent of   for all Og, g, t and c, and 
therefore we can write the probability of an outcome as:  
)VV(exp1
)VV(exp
)VV(exp1
)VV(exp
);,O,g,V,ccˆPr(
t
OO
t
OO
g
O
c
t
OO
t
OO
g
O
c
t
OO
t
OO
g
O
1c
t
OO
t
OO
g
O
1c
gt
O
t,g
ggggg
ggggg
ggggg
ggggg
g













g
g
g
g
O
t
O
t
O
t
O
t
t
βZ'
βZ'
β'Z
βZ'
θZ'
, 
(4) 
in which we denote the vector of unknown parameters by θ . The likelihood contribution 
);,V,( iti θZ'it   for any sampled individual, conditional on the unobservable  , is then 
constructed by the product of the probabilities of the school and labor market outcomes as expressed 
by (4) realized in each time period t between the start of primary school, and the labor market entry 
or the highest grade that the respondent has attained at the interview date at age 23. 
                                                 
24 The outcome scholastic ability test (AFQT) that Cameron and Heckman (2001) add as control in part of their models may capture these unobserved 
determinants of early schooling outcomes. Belzil and Poinas (2010) add an indicator for grade repetition in primary school to proxy for these 
unobservables, but do not take the endogeneity of this variable into account.  
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Following Heckman and Singer (1984), we adopt a non-parametric discrete distribution for the 
unobserved random variable  . We assume that this distribution is characterized by an a priori 
unknown number of K points of support k  to which are assigned probabilities )(pk λ  specified as 
logistic transforms:  
 
    0and',...,,,K,...2,1kwith
)λexp(
)λexp(
p 1K21K
1j
j
k
k 


λλ
. 
(5) 
Hence, the unconditional individual likelihood contribution for an agent i is:  
  


K
1k
kitikiti );,V,(p),;V,( θZ'λλθZ' itit 
. 
(6) 
Since the estimation is conducted separately on the native and immigrant sample, the log-likelihood 
function is the logarithm of these unconditional likelihood contributions summed over all Nj (j = N, 
I) sampled individuals, where NN (NI) stands for the number of sampled native (immigrant) 
individuals. This is maximized with respect to the unknown parameters. In order to determine the 
number of points of support we follow common practice (see, e.g., Belzil and Poinas, 2010) and 
select the number of mass points by choosing the model that minimizes an information criterion. In 
our case (cf. Section 4.3) the optimal choice minimizes both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
4.2 Goodness-of-Fit and Decomposition Strategy 
In order to answer our main research questions, we develop a “counterfactual” decomposition 
strategy in the spirit of Machado and Mata (2005) aimed at disentangling the respective importance 
of pure ethnic differences versus differences in observed endowments between natives and 
immigrants in explaining the observed ethnic gap in educational attainment (conditioning on 
educational delay or not) and in school-to-work transitions. Moreover, we propose a method to 
decompose the residual pure ethnic gap according to the moment at which it is generated. We first 
propose a simulation method to test the model’s capacity to fit the ethnic gaps of a particular 
outcome. Subsequently, we discuss how, based on this simulation method, we can realize the 
aforementioned decompositions. 
The method simulates the model on random samples each of size R (R = 5,000 in the 
application) of the native and immigrant samples that were used for estimation. Let NΖ  and I
Z
 
be 
MR  matrices storing the R random draws from the native respectively immigrant youth observed 
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exogenous endowment distributions and from the time-varying strictly exogenous variables. Let Nθˆ  
and Iθˆ  denote the native respectively immigrant parameter estimates including the ones that refer to 
the endogenous variables (grade g and schooling delay Vt) and the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution. In this simulation, the endogenous variables take on all possible values weighted by 
their predicted probability of occurrence according to the parameter estimates. The observed gap as 
represented by the log expected odds ratio between natives and immigrants of a particular outcome 
(for instance, the probability of passing sixth grade of secondary education) can then be predicted by 
simulation as follows:  
 













 



 
IIZ
NNZ
θZ
θZ
I
N
ˆ;ccˆPrE
ˆ;ccˆPrE
log
g
g
O
t,g
O
t,g
, 
(7) 
where 



  .;.ccˆPr g
O
t,g  is the probability that the particular outcome ccˆ
gO
t,g 
25
 
is realized according 
to the model simulation and 
N
EZ  and I
EZ  the expectations over the distributions of NZ  
respectively IZ . Note that the existing literature expresses the gap in terms of the absolute 
difference in the probabilities of realization of a particular outcome instead of in terms of the log 
odds ratio. Expressing the ethnic gap in terms of the log odds ratio will prove to be useful in 
decomposing the residual pure ethnic gap according to the moments that it is generated. The 95% 
confidence intervals of these (and subsequent) log odds ratios are constructed by simulation, the 
steps of which are given in Appendix B. 
We now propose the following decomposition of the predicted ethnic gap, as expressed by the 
log odds ratio in Equation (7) into the sum of an “explained” and a “residual pure ethnic gap”:  

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. 
(8) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (8) is the gap that can be explained by differences in the 
observed endowments NZ  and I
Z
 
evaluated by using the parameters as estimated on the native 
                                                 
25 We may consider outcomes that are not conditioned on any particular time period t or grade g. In that case one would take the expectation of the 
probability over this dimension. Alternatively, we may consider outcomes in which the number of years of schooling delay is specified. For instance, in the 
empirical analysis we consider schooling outcomes at particular grades (passing a grade or continuing education after passing that grade) that are attained 
without schooling delay. Then for some g > 0 the probability of interest is given by 



  .;.1cˆPr g
O
g,g , since after starting secondary school a schooling 
outcome can only be attained without delay if the outcome is successful at all t = g. 
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sample, Nθˆ . The last term in Equation (8) defines the residual “pure ethnic gap”. It reflects the gap 
induced by differences in the parameter estimates, including the ones that relate to the 
unobservables, between native and immigrant youth.
26
 It is the latter gap that has been found in the 
literature to be negligible (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Belzil and Poinas, 2010) or reduced 
substantially (Colding, 2006; Colding at al., 2009) as compared to the observed gap, both in terms 
of educational outcomes as in indicators of successful school-to-work transitions and which has led 
researchers to conclude that the ethnic gap in outcomes is not due to discrimination, but rather to a 
shortfall in skills, natives and immigrants alike.  
In the empirical analysis below, we will show that, in line with the existing literature, the pure 
ethnic gap in educational outcomes (leaving schooling delay unspecified) is indeed relatively small 
or even disappears if we consider the gap at the enrolment in higher education. However, if we 
consider the realization of schooling outcomes without delay or success in the school-to-work 
transition, this is no longer the case. Then, in order to identify the cause of this gap, it is useful to 
determine the moment at which it originates. We therefore propose a procedure that decomposes the 
pure ethnic gap into parts that depend on the moments that it is generated. It uses the fact that a 
particular educational attainment can only be realized if at earlier stages educational outcomes were 
successful: educational attainments realize sequentially. This means that we can write the 
probability of a successful educational outcome as a product of conditional probabilities in which 
the conditioning is each time related to a successful educational outcome at an earlier stage. If we 
write the ethnic gaps in terms of log odds ratios, we can therefore decompose a successful 
educational outcome at a particular stage in a sum of log odds ratios of the conditional probabilities 
of educational success in earlier stages. 
We explain the decomposition procedure on the basis of an example. Suppose that we are 
interested in identifying when the pure ethnic gap in the fraction that passes fifth grade of secondary 
school ( 1cˆ
3
5  ) originates. We therefore aim at decomposing the pure ethnic gap of this outcome, 
as defined on the left-hand side of the equality in Equation (9):
27
 
 
                                                 
26 An alternative decomposition strategy consists in evaluating the endowment gap at the immigrant parameter estimates and the pure ethnic gap at the 
values of the native covariates. By conditioning on the endowments of the immigrant youth, as we do in Equation (8) and in the benchmark empirical 
analysis, we focus on the gap for youth with typical immigrant characteristics, i.e. at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. We implement the 
alternative decomposition as a sensitivity analysis (cf. infra). 
27 Note that we do not condition the choice on t, meaning that we implicitly average over t (cf. footnote 23). 
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(9) 
Notice first that this gap cannot realize before the start of fourth grade of secondary school, since by 
compulsory schooling until age 18 nobody leaves school before this moment. This means that, if we 
ignore schooling delays for the moment, the first moment at which the ethnic gap can differ from 
zero is by not passing fourth grade of secondary school ( 0cˆ34  ). The gap that is generated at that 
moment is expressed by the first term on the right-hand side of the equality in Equation (9). 
Subsequently, the gap can further originate from deciding not to start fifth grade ( 0cˆ44  ), 
conditional on having passed fourth grade ( 1cˆ34  ). This source of the gap is quantified by the 
second term on the right-hand side of the equality sign in Equation (9). Finally, the source of the gap 
can originate from not having passed fifth grade of secondary school ( 0cˆ35  ), conditional on 
deciding to start fifth grade ( 1cˆ
4
4  ). The sum of the terms on the right-hand side of the equality in 
(9) is by construction equal to the term on the left-hand side. This means that we can determine the 
relative importance of the moments at which the gap originates. It is not difficult to generalize this 
procedure for other outcomes and longer sequences of outcomes. This is what we do in the 
empirical application. 
5. Results 
We estimate the econometric model separately for native and immigrant youth. As mentioned in 
Section 4.1, we did this by gradually adding points of support until the log-likelihood value of the 
model failed to increase. Subsequently, we chose the best fitting model according to two 
information criteria. Table 3 in Appendix A reports the log-likelihood, the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values of the model according to the 
estimated number of points of support of the heterogeneity distribution. All information criteria are 
lower for the models that control for unobserved heterogeneity than for a simpler scheme that 
ignores unobserved heterogeneity. The lowest AIC and BIC values are obtained with five points of 
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support for both the native and the immigrant youth. 
Since the main aim of this paper is to decompose the ethnic gap in educational attainment and in 
school-to-work transitions, and since we have estimated a large number of parameters (nearly one 
hundred for each ethnic group),
28
 we do not report the estimated parameters. These are available on 
request. Instead, we first report a goodness-of-fit analysis with respect to the main outcomes of 
interest. Subsequently, we present the decomposition along the lines of our presentation in Section 
4.2. In Section 5.3 we specifically focus on the role that language plays in this composition. Finally, 
we briefly present some sensitivity analyses in Section 5.4. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
5.1 Goodness of Fit 
We simulate the fraction of both native and immigrant youth who realize a variety of schooling 
and labor market outcomes. The difference between the first two columns of Table 2 (or the two 
first panels of Figure 3 for the main outcomes of interest) measures the goodness of fit of our 
model. Column A describes the observed gaps between native and immigrant youth in our data by 
means of log odds ratios of the native respectively the immigrant schooling and labor market 
outcome probabilities. A positive number means that native youth is more likely to achieve the 
considered outcome. Since x)x1log(  , these log odds ratios mirror the proportional gaps 
between native and immigrant youth as reported in the descriptive analysis in Section 3.2. Column B 
describes the corresponding gaps based on the simulations that were described in Section 4.2. The 
main outcomes of interest, introduced as motivating gaps in Section 3.2, are denoted in bold and 
shaded in grey. The decomposition of the gaps according to the moments at which they originate are 
reported in the lines below the main outcomes of interest (neither in bold nor shaded in grey). They 
sum to the main outcome of which they are components. The fit is very good, since in all cases, the 
actual gap lies within the 95% confidence interval of the simulated outcome. 
5.2 The Role of Family Endowments in Explaining the Gaps 
Column C of Table 2 presents the pure ethnic gap for a range of outcomes as obtained by 
conducting the counterfactual simulations outlined in Section 4.2, i.e. by equating the observed 
                                                 
28 When comparing these numbers of parameters to the size of our native and immigrant research sample one should take in mind that we observe (and 
model) multiple observations for each individual. 
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family endowments of both ethnic groups to the immigrant level. We first discuss the findings with 
respect to schooling outcomes without specifying the potential delay with which these are attained. 
This is common in the literature. Subsequently, we contrast these results to those obtained for the 
same schooling outcomes, but restricting that these outcomes should be realized without schooling 
delay. Finally, we consider the pure ethnic gap in the school-to-work transition. We decompose the 
pure ethnic gaps of all considered outcomes as to determine the key moments at which these pure 
ethnic gaps are generated. 
First, we focus on the probability of passing the last (sixth) grade of secondary school. Equating 
observed endowments reduces the log odds ratio of this (predicted) probability from 0.21 to 0.07. 
This means that if a native and an immigrant child are equal in terms of individual and household 
characteristics the native child is about 7% more likely to complete secondary education. Second, 
we consider the probability of enrolling in tertiary education. In this case conditioning on observed 
endowments completely eliminates the 35 points wide predicted ethnic gap. These results are 
completely in line with the literature mentioned in the Introduction. Differences in family 
background explain the gap in educational attainment to a large extent and especially so for higher 
levels of education. 
In the lines below these main outcomes denoted in bold in Table 2 the pure ethnic gaps are 
further decomposed. First, consider the 7% pure ethnic gap of successfully completing secondary 
school. Decomposing this gap by analogy with the lines of Equation (9) in Section 4.2, we find that 
the major part of this gap is generated by a higher dropout rate for immigrants after successfully 
completing fourth grade of secondary school and by a higher fraction that does not successfully pass 
sixth grade after starting it. At these moments 2% respectively 3% of the 7% total pure ethnic gap 
originates. However, these interpretations are hazardous, since these subcomponents are small and 
not very precisely estimated. We conclude that it is difficult to assign a precise moment at which 
this pure ethnic gap emerges. But this is not so problematic given that the total pure ethnic gap is 
small anyway. Second, the decomposition of the zero pure ethnic gap with regards to enrolment in 
tertiary education learns that it arises by a pure ethnic advantage of 7% that arises for immigrants in 
this enrolment decision conditional on secondary school completion. This advantage erases the 
aforementioned 7% gap in secondary school completion. Cameron and Heckman (2001) report 
similar findings for the US. This ethnic advantage may reflect that for a given level of 
socioeconomic background immigrant youths possess “better” unobserved characteristics (ability or 
motivation) than native youth, since parents of immigrants may, as a consequence of fewer 
opportunities, have attained a lower level of educational attainment than parents of natives. In other 
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words, for a same level of educational attainment of their parents immigrants may be more able or 
more motivated than natives, and may therefore more likely enroll in higher education. However, 
further research is required to confirm this interpretation.  
We now consider the same two educational outcomes, but restrict these outcomes to be realized 
without schooling delay. As already mentioned in Section 3.2, this restriction substantially increases 
the total ethnic gaps for these outcomes. The log odds ratio for completing secondary education 
increases from 0.21 to 0.61, and for enrolling in tertiary education from 0.35 to 0.72. More 
importantly, even if these gaps are substantially reduced if observed family endowments are 
controlled for, in contrast to the case in which no schooling delay is specified, the pure ethnic gaps 
remain substantial: 0.34 respectively 0.29. This is an important finding, since it means that ethnic 
schooling gaps, in particular gaps in schooling delay, cannot be eliminated by focusing policy to 
disadvantaged groups irrespectively of their ethnic background. It also suggests that similar 
conclusions might arise with respect to other measures of educational achievement within a 
particular level of educational attainment, such as scores on standardized tests of achievement, 
implying that our findings may also be relevant for countries in which grade retention is less wide 
spread than in Belgium. 
In the lines below these log odd ratios are decomposed according to the grade in which they 
originate. First, observe that the lower pure ethnic gap for enrolment in higher education without any 
delay reflects a pure ethnic advantage for immigrants that was also detected in case we did not 
specify the schooling delay. This 5% advantage is, however, no longer significantly different from 
zero. More interesting is to get an insight into the grades at which the 0.34 gap in the log odds ratio 
in secondary school completion is generated. Since the pure ethnic gap matters predominantly if 
schooling delay is taken into account, we know that it is retention and not drop out that is the main 
driver of the pure ethnic gap at each grade. We therefore in this decomposition make no distinction 
between passing and the decision to continue schooling within each grade. From Table 2 we deduce 
that, even if the pure ethnic gap seems to emerge relatively gradually throughout the educational 
progression, the major part originates in secondary school. The components of the total odds ratio 
assigned to secondary school sum to 0.19, while those generated during or at the start of primary 
school sum to 0.15 only. This is, however, not unexpected, since retention is in Belgium more 
frequently used in secondary school than in primary school. The data did not allow determining at 
which particular grades of primary school the pure gap emerges. We can only conclude that the ratio 
attained already 0.03 at the start of primary school, so that the remaining 0.12 is generated during 
the first six compulsory schooling years. By contrast, within secondary school we can identify the 
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evolution of the pure ethnic gap by grade. There we can (again) clearly identify fourth grade as a 
major source of the pure gap: 0.07 of the total 0.34 originates in that grade. This means that more 
than 20% of the total pure gap that is generated between the start of primary school and the end of 
secondary school can be assigned to this grade. This is an important finding, since it informs to 
which grade analysts should target attention to get a better understanding of where the pure ethnic 
gap originates from. The analysis learns in addition that the first, third and last year of secondary 
school are critical as well, but to a lesser extent. 
Finally, we consider the pure ethnic gap in being employed three months after leaving school 
given a particular level of school attainment.
29
 As can be deduced from Column C, and in contrast 
with the findings of Belzil and Poinas (2010), for all levels of education equating observed 
endowments between natives and immigrants hardly reduces the ethnic gaps in the transition to 
work. Independently of the level of education, a native school-leaver is about 30% more likely to be 
employed three months after leaving school compared with an immigrant school-leaver with the 
same observed endowments. This suggests that, in contrast to France, discrimination of ethnic 
minorities may affect labor market outcomes of ethnic minorities in Belgium (Flanders). 
Notwithstanding that, as discussed below, alternative and complementary interpretations are 
possible, these results square with the findings of the field experiment conducted by Baert et al. 
(2013) for school-leavers in Flanders. This correspondence test indicates that in Flanders Turkish 
school graduates have to send out 44% more job applications in order to get the same amount of job 
interviews as their Flemish clones and points therefore to discrimination as a relevant explanation of 
the important pure ethnic gap in the labor market outcome that we find.  
Contrary to the existing literature, we thus find evidence for important pure ethnic gaps in 
educational outcomes and in the transition from school to work. For the educational outcomes this is 
a consequence of explicitly taking schooling delays into account. These pure ethnic gaps need to be 
interpreted with caution and may not be simply identified with proof of discrimination. 
Discrimination is just one explanation among others. We mention a number of alternative 
explanations without aiming to be comprehensive. First, the pure ethnic gap may partly be caused 
by ethnic differences in preferences or expectations. Constant et al. (2010) provide evidence on 
divergence in economic preferences and attitudes between natives and second generation migrants 
in Germany. Migrants are found to be, for instance, less risk-averse. Moreover, they conclude that 
these differentials matter in terms of employment probabilities two months after unemployment 
                                                 
29 We only present labor market outcomes conditional on the educational level, because not all respondents completed education at the time the survey was 
conducted at age 23 (cf. Section 3.2).  
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entry. More evidence on the importance of preferences and expectations in explaining school 
attainment and labor market outcome gaps is provided by, e.g., Hennessey et al. (2008), Filippin 
(2009) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2010). Second, a recent literature deals with the role of 
ethnic networks in explaining labor market outcome gaps (Winters, 2001; Mahuteau and Juanankar, 
2008; Yamauchi and Tanabe, 2008; Zenou, 2011) and diverging school outcomes can be related to 
class and school segregation of migrants as a consequence of the concentration of immigrants in 
certain neighborhoods (Colding, 2006; Colding et al., 2009; Dustmann et al., 2010). Third, in the 
absence of specific teaching incentive programs for disadvantaged or immigrant groups (Dustmann 
et al., 2010), teachers may pay more attention to native (advantaged) groups. Fourth, part of the pure 
ethnic gap can be related to differentials in the unobserved “ability” distributions between natives 
and immigrants (Cameron and Heckman, 2001). Finally, part of the pure ethnic gap may be induced 
by differences in language proficiency that are not captured by the language usage variable that was 
controlled for in the analysis. We turn to a discussion of this point in the next section.  
5.3 Gap Closing Role for Language? 
Column E of Table 2 presents evidence on language spoken at parental home as a source of 
schooling and first labor market gaps between native and immigrant youth. In the spirit of Cameron 
and Heckman (2001) these gaps are obtained by estimating the following ratio:  
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(10) 
in which *IZ  differs from IZ  by the value of the variable capturing usage of Dutch at the parental 
home. This value is set in *IZ  for all draws to the mean native level. 
From Column E of Table 2 we deduce that speaking Dutch at home plays hardly any role in 
closing the observed ethnic gap in educational attainment. The contribution of language is always 
very small and mostly not significantly different from zero. Conditional on graduation from 
secondary school, it explains 2 of the 14 points predicted log odds in enrolling in tertiary education 
(without delay). Noticing in addition that by controlling for other observed family endowments this 
predicted gap even turns into a 7 points pure ethnic advantage for immigrants, this contribution is 
small. Our estimates also indicate that not speaking Dutch at home is rather an advantage than a 
disadvantage for immigrants to continue schooling without delay, since it decreases the predicted 
ethnic gap significantly by one percentage point in all but fourth and fifth grade of secondary school. 
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This is consistent with the findings of Dustmann et al. (2010) indicating that in the UK during 
secondary school the educational achievement of ethnic minority pupils for whom English is not the 
mother tongue improves more relative to White British pupils than that of ethnic minority pupils for 
whom English is the mother tongue. However, globally these ethnic advantages are no longer 
significantly different from zero if the unconditional gap in graduating from secondary school 
without delay is considered.  
These findings suggest that policies encouraging immigrant families to speak the native language 
at home are not effective in reducing the ethnic gap in school attainment. The fact that we could not 
discriminate between those families who speak Dutch at home among other languages from those 
that just speak the native language could be an explanation. In addition, we could not control for the 
quality of the spoken language. It may well be that speaking the native language matters only if the 
communication partners have native speaker proficiency. Other researchers finding some positive 
evidence of language indeed included some measure of proficiency as control variable (van Ours 
and Veenman 2003; Dustmann et al., 2010).  
Column E of Table 2 reports more, but still not very strong, evidence that speaking Dutch at 
home enhances the likelihood of transiting from school to work. It explains as much as six (=16%) 
points of the 37 points predicted gap for the low educated, but only three points (8%) for the high 
educated who left school (before age 23). The finding that usage of native language at home helps 
more the low than high educated immigrant youth in finding a job is in line with Aldashev et al. 
(2009) and is consistent with the hypothesis that language usage is helpful in basic communications 
as required in low skilled job, but that it is no guarantee for proficiency, which is essential for high 
skilled jobs.  
5.4 Robustness Checks 
We performed several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the results. First, we 
investigated the alternative decomposition strategy evaluating the pure ethnic gap at the native 
covariate registrations and thereby focusing on the higher end of the socioeconomic scale. In 
general, the results, as presented in Column D of Table 2, are in line with our main results. 
However, the pure ethnic gap in the probability of enrolling in higher education is now significant. 
This is because the pure immigrant advantage in enrolling in higher education conditional on 
secondary school completion disappears in this case: in comparison with Column C the pure ethnic 
gap for this outcome is 0.02 and insignificant instead of -0.07 and significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that the immigrant advantage in terms of unobservables, as argued in Section 5.2, 
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disappears if parents of immigrants acquire similar levels of educational attainment as parents from 
natives. The obtained pure ethnic gap concerning the probability of being employed three months 
after leaving school is somewhat lower following this alternative decomposition strategy: 0.12 and 
insignificant for the low educated and 0.20 and significant at the 5% level for the high educated. 
Immigrants with high socioeconomic background may be less penalized in terms of labour market 
networks relative to natives than immigrants with a low socioeconomic background.  
Second, we re-estimated our model replacing our indicator of labor market success by an 
alternative one, i.e. being employed with a permanent contract two years after leaving school. Since 
at age 23 relatively few individuals have left education for two years or more, we had to use the data 
gathered in the follow-up interviews at ages 26 and 29. This means that these results are subject to 
sample attrition, especially for the higher educated group, since this group is the most likely to have 
left school less than two years ago at age 23. We report the goodness-of-fit and the decomposition 
results of this model in Table A–4 in Appendix A. Even if the predictions for the alternative labor 
market outcome deviate more from the observed ones than those in the benchmark model and are 
less stable between the different considered educational levels, the fit is satisfactory in that all the 
observed ethnic gaps lie in the 95% confidence interval of the simulation.  
For the low educated both the total observed (total simulated) and the pure ethnic gap in being 
employed with a permanent contract two years after leaving school are much higher than in the 
benchmark model. The log odds ratio is respectively 0.74 (0.63) and 0.61 compared to 0.36 (0.37) 
and 0.28 in the benchmark. We therefore conclude that for the low educated the observed family 
endowments and prior school attainment seem to explain little of the ethnic gap in this alternative 
indicator of labor market success. The residual pure ethnic gap increases even substantially 
compared to the benchmark. 
For the high educated the findings are less stable. This may be related to the attrition problem for 
this group, so more care should be taken in the conclusions. If we consider the labor market 
outcome of highest educated group, we observe that both the observed (simulated) and pure ethnic 
gap are close to zero: respectively -0.09 (0.03) and 0.02. However, if we consider the highest 
educated group but one, which was one of the main considered outcomes (denoted in bold), then the 
findings are much closer to the benchmark results. The aforementioned log odds ratios are then 0.27 
(0.28) and 0.27 compared to 0.35 (0.37) and 0.34 in the benchmark. We conclude that the finding of 
the benchmark model that the pure ethnic gap of the labor market outcome is substantial is relatively 
robust, except for the highest level of education. However, due to drop out selectivity, the sensitivity 
analysis is less reliable for the latter group.  
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Third, we narrowed down our immigrant population definition. First, we restricted the immigrant 
population to the immigrant respondents with a Belgian nationality. In contrast to Euwals et al. 
(2010) who find a significantly positive relation between citizenship on the one hand and 
employment, tenured employment and job prestige on the other hand in the Netherlands, we obtain, 
for both the total and the pure ethnic gaps, very similar simulation results to our benchmark. This 
can be a consequence of the quasi exclusion of first generation immigrants from our sample (cf. 
Section 3.2). Second, we restricted the immigrant population to the more homogeneous population 
of youth with a Turkish or Moroccan origin. Using this definition leads to slightly larger predicted 
and simulated pure ethnic gaps. However, even if, as a consequence of the smaller sample sizes, the 
estimates are less precise, the empirical pattern remains very similar. The simulation results for the 
latter two sensitivity analyses are available on request. 
6. Conclusions 
Recently, researchers, among whom Heckman (2011), have claimed that ethnic gaps are 
primarily due to a lack of skills and that, consequently, by closing the gaps in skills, reflecting gaps 
in observed family endowments, the racial gaps disappears. In this research we investigated whether 
this claim upholds for Belgian society. To that purpose we built a dynamic schooling progression 
model that includes the school-to-work transition as a labor market outcome and estimated this 
model, separately on natives and immigrants, on a random sample of three birth cohorts living in 
Flanders, the Dutch speaking region in the North of Belgium. We then used this model to 
decompose, free of dynamic selection bias, the observed gap in both educational attainment and 
successful school-to-work transitions between native and immigrant youth into a part that can be 
explained by observed family endowments and a part that is inherent to ethnicity, the so called “pure 
ethnic gap”. In this analysis natives are contrasted to grandchildren of women of “non-Western” 
nationality. We essentially excluded first generation immigrants from the analysis since only 
grandchildren born in Belgium or immigrated prior to age three were retained. Consequently, since 
the educational attainment of second generation immigrants is found to be better than that of first 
generation immigrants, the gap in the educational attainment found in this research is to be 
considered as a lower bound for the gap of first generation immigrants.  
 We contributed to the literature in essentially four dimensions. First, we incorporated years of 
schooling delay in the measures of educational attainment that are usually considered, such as 
completing secondary education or enrolling in higher education. We argued that it is important to 
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incorporate this dimension, since arriving on the labor market with delay is very costly. Moreover, 
we pointed out that in countries where schooling delays are not important other scholastic 
achievement could play a similar role. Second, based on the insight that schooling outcomes realize 
sequentially, we proposed a method that allows identifying the moments at which the pure ethnic 
gaps emerge most prominently and therefore offer a tool that helps targeting research that tries to 
understand the origins of these gaps. Third, we moved a step forward by disentangling the 
educational outcomes within a particular grade. We distinguished between the educational 
achievement (passing or failing) realized at the end of each grade and the decision to continue 
schooling (rather than stopping) at the end of each school year. Finally, we innovated by including 
an indicator of whether the native language is spoken at home among the observed family 
endowments to investigate the role this factor plays in closing the observed ethnic gaps. 
Our findings are the following. First, consistent with the existing literature, we find that observed 
family endowments alone explain the major part of the observed gap in secondary school 
completion and all of it with regards to the enrolment in higher education. This seems to suggest 
therefore that no specific policy for ethnic minorities is warranted to eliminate the existing schooling 
gaps in Belgium. However, once we take schooling delays into account this conclusion is no longer 
valid. The pure log odds ratio between natives and immigrants of the probability of completing 
secondary education without delay and of enrolling in higher education without delay is respectively 
0.34 and 0.29.  
Second, if we decompose the latter log odds ratios we find that the pure ethnic gap grows 
gradually throughout the educational progression. However, since retention is mainly used during 
secondary school, the major part of the pure ethnic gap in secondary school completion (0.19) 
emerges during this period. Fourth grade of secondary school has been identified as one of the key 
moments at which this gap originates: more than 20% of the total pure ethnic gap in the fraction that 
graduates from secondary school without delay is generated in this grade.  
Third, in contrast to the finding of Belzil and Poinas (2010) for France, we find that family 
endowments and school attainment explain little of the ethnic gap in school-to-work transitions in 
Belgium. Independently of the level of education, a native school-leaver is about 30% more likely to 
be employed three months after leaving school compared with an immigrant school-leaver with the 
same observed endowments. For low educated school-leavers this conclusion is reinforced if an 
alternative labor market indicator that measures permanent employment two years after graduation 
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is used. In that case the native school-leaver is even 80%
30
 more likely to be employed in such a 
contract.  
Finally, we find that speaking Dutch at home plays hardly any role in closing the ethnic gap in 
educational attainment, but that it does matter to some extent in explaining the different rate of 
transition from school to work between natives and immigrants, especially for the low educated. 
The fact that language is found to be less important than in other studies may be a consequence of 
our measure not capturing the proficiency of the native language sufficiently precisely. At the same 
time these findings are valuable in that they demonstrate that policies encouraging immigrant 
families to speak the native language at home are not very effective in reducing gaps in schooling, 
and labor market outcomes, especially among the high educated. Ensuring a higher degree of 
proficiency may be more effective, but more difficult to achieve.  
Based on our analysis we disagree with the earlier evidence that observed ethnic gaps in 
educational achievement could be eliminated by targeting policy to socially disadvantaged groups 
irrespectively of their ethnic origin. We found that important ethnic gaps unrelated to family 
background may remain important if finer measurements of educational outcomes, such as in this 
study by specifying whether an educational level is attained with delay or not, are used. Therefore 
we believe that policies aimed at specific ethnic groups are still warranted to eliminate the ethnic 
gap in educational achievement. In addition, even if alternative explanations are possible, we believe 
that discrimination is a major candidate in explaining the important pure ethnic gap that we found in 
the transition from school to work in Belgium. 
  
                                                 
30 This corresponds to a log odds ratio of 0.61. 
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Appendix A: Additional tables 
INSERT TABLE A-1 HERE 
INSERT TABLE A-2 HERE 
INSERT TABLE A-3 HERE 
INSERT TABLE A-4 HERE
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Appendix B: Steps in the Construction of the Simulated 95% Confidence Intervals of the 
Log Odds Ratios  
The following steps are involved in the construction of the 95% confidence interval of the 
probability of any (log odds ratio of an) outcome of interest:  
1. Randomly draw a vector of parameters from the asymptotic Normal distribution of all 
native respectively immigrant parameter estimates including the ones that refer to the 
endogenous variables (grade g and schooling delay tV ) and the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution; 
2. Consider the first estimated point of support of the unobservables and associate it to the R 
draws of the native and immigrant sample, i.e. to NZ  respectively IZ ;  
3. Consider for all R vectors of observed and unobserved variables all possible paths that lead 
to the outcome of interest and calculate the chain of probabilities associated to each of these 
paths using the drawn parameter estimates as to predict the probabilities that these paths are 
realized;  
4. Sum over all the possible paths to predict the R probabilities of realization of the outcome 
of interest for the R draws of observed and unobserved explanatory variables; 
5. Consider the draw of the next estimated point of support and repeat the steps 2 to 5 until the 
K estimated points of support are considered; 
6. Calculate the weighted sum of the probabilities calculated in step 4 for each point of 
support where the weights correspond to the drawn estimated probability )ˆ(pk λ ;  
7. Go to step 1 and repeat all subsequent steps until these steps are repeated J = 999 times. 
8. The 95% confidence interval can be constructed by choosing the appropriate percentiles of 
the J = 999 simulated probabilities. 
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